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THE MISAPPLICATION OF LEUNG KWOK HUNG IN 
HONG KONG: AUTHORIZING THE RATIONALITY 
REQUIREMENT FOR TEXTUALLY ABSOLUTE RIGHTS  
Albert Connor Buchman† 
Abstract: The Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (BORO) guarantees many 
fundamental rights to Hong Kong’s permanent residents.  In these constitutionally 
significant statutes, two types of rights exist:  1) textually qualified rights, which contain 
qualifying language indicating for what purposes a legislated restriction is permissible, 
such as when necessary for national security, public order, public health or morals, and 2) 
textually absolute rights, which contain no language indicating when a legislated 
restriction on that right is permissible.  In Leung Kwok Hung & Others v. HKSAR, the 
Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal formulated a rationality requirement for when 
restrictions are constitutionally valid.  The Court held that the rationality requirement is 
derived from the word “necessary” in qualifying language in the BORO Article 
considered by the Court.  First, this comment argues that subsequent courts have 
misapplied Leung Kwok Hung’s formulation of the rationality requirement when 
considering textually absolute BORO rights that do not contain the word “necessary.”  
Second, this comment analyzes two possible approaches to correcting this misapplication 
by constitutionally authorizing the rationality requirement for textually absolute rights in 
a manner not reliant on the word “necessary.”  This comment ultimately argues that the 
second approach, implying the rationality requirement into the BORO, should be 
followed.    
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2002, political activist Leung Kwok Hung and his assistants led 
between forty and ninety-six people down Hong Kong’s Queensway, a 
public highway.1  Arriving at the Hong Kong Police Headquarters, the 
peaceful assembly protested the conviction of an activist for the assault and 
obstruction of a police officer.2  The assembly leaders had previously refused 
to follow a statutory notification procedure that allows the Police 
Commissioner discretion to object to peaceful processions on the grounds of 
public order.3  Police arrested the assembly leaders who were later convicted 
of holding an unauthorized assembly in violation of this statute.4  They 
ultimately appealed to Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal,5 arguing that the 
                                           
† The author would like to thank Professor Theodore Myhre and the editorial staff of the Pacific 
Rim Law & Policy Journal, especially Dr. George Radics, Lindsey Grieve, and Megan Winder.  
1 Leung Kwok Hung & Others v. HKSAR, [2005] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 164, 176 (C.F.A.). 
2 Id. at 176-77. 
3 Public Order Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 245, § 13A. (H.K.). 
4 Id.  
5 For an account of Leung Kwok Hung’s and the assembly’s case through the various levels of 
Hong Kong’s courts, see Janice Brabyn, Leung Kwok Hung and Others through the Hong Kong Courts, 36 
HONG KONG L. J. 83 (2006). 
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statutory notification procedure unconstitutionally infringed on their 
fundamental right to peaceful assembly guaranteed by Article 17 of the 
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (“BORO”).6  In its final decision, 
Leung Kwok Hung & Others v. HKSAR, the Court formulated the basis for 
the rationality requirement.7  This requirement requires that restrictions on 
BORO rights “be rationally connected with one or more of the legitimate 
purposes [of the restriction].”8  According to the Court’s formulation, the 
requirement is derived from the word “necessary” in BORO articles that 
contain the word.9  Subsequent Hong Kong courts, however, have 
misapplied this formulation when determining the constitutionality of 
restrictions on BORO rights that do not contain the word “necessary.”10  
The BORO incorporates fundamental rights found in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)11 into Hong Kong’s 
domestic law.12  Although enacted as ordinary legislation,13 the BORO gains 
constitutional significance through Article 39 of Hong Kong’s constitution, 
the Basic Law,14 mandating that the ICCPR is to be applied to the region.15  
Part II of the BORO states most fundamental rights in textually absolute 
form, meaning that BORO articles provide no qualifying language indicating 
when that right may be restricted.16  For example, the right to freedom of 
opinion contained in Article 16 of the BORO simply states: “[e]veryone 
shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.”17  In contrast to 
textually absolute form, five BORO articles state rights in textually qualified 
                                           
6 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, (1991) Cap. 383, Part II, art. 17. (H.K.) [hereinafter BORO]; 
see Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 177-79. 
7 See Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 184. 
8 Id.  
9 See id.; see infra Part III.A.  This comment refers to rights provided by articles containing the 
word “necessary” as “textually qualified rights.” See infra note 15. 
10  See infra Part II.B.  This comment refers to rights contained in articles not containing the word 
“necessary” as “textually absolute rights.” See infra note 15.  
11 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, Supp. 
No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
12 See XIANGGANG JI BEN FA, art. 39 (1990) (H.K.), available at http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/ 
en/basiclawtext/images/Basic_Law.pdf. [hereinafter BASIC LAW].  Furthermore, provisions of the BORO 
mandate that any legislation enacted in Hong Kong cannot be inconsistent with rights supplied by the 
BORO.  See BORO, supra note 6, Part I, §§ 3, 4. 
13 See Simon N. M. Young, Restricting Basic Rights in Hong Kong, 34 HONG KONG L. J. 109, 115 
(2004). 
14 See id. at 115-16. 
15 See BASIC LAW, supra note 12. 
16 See YASH GHAI. HONG KONG’S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: THE RESUMPTION OF CHINESE 
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASIC LAW 443-44 (2d ed. 1999) (noting that BORO rights are formulated in 
“absolute” or “qualified” terms).  The author has developed the terms “textually qualified” and “textually 
absolute” in this comment for ease of reference.  The term “textually” is used to maintain the distinction 
rights may be formulated in their BORO text in absolute or qualified terms.  
17 BORO, supra note 6, art. 16(1). 




form, meaning that the articles provide language indicating on what grounds 
that right may be restricted.18  For example, Article 8, providing the right of 
liberty of movement, allows restrictions when “necessary to protect national 
security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and 
freedoms of others.” 19   
Hong Kong courts have consistently upheld restrictions imposed by 
Hong Kong’s local legislature, the Legislative Council, on both textually 
absolute and textually qualified BORO rights.20  Generally, in doing so, 
courts require that any restriction on a BORO right be rationally connected 
with the pursuit of one or more legitimate societal aims (“rationality 
requirement”). 21  The Court of Final Appeal set out the standard formulation 
for the rationality requirement in Leung Kwok Hung.  In this case, the Court 
considered the textually qualified right of peaceful assembly contained in 
Article 17 of the BORO.  The text of this right states that restrictions are 
allowed when “imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, 
public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”22  Interpreting this Article, 
the Court asserted that the rationality requirement is derived from the word 
“necessary.”23 
Subsequently, courts have cited Leung Kwok Hung as primary 
authority for the rationality requirement when considering the 
constitutionality of restrictions on both textually absolute and textually 
qualified fundamental rights.24  However, these courts have misapplied the 
Leung Kwok Hung formulation by utilizing the rationality requirement for 
textually absolute rights that do not contain the word “necessary.”25  
This comment argues that Hong Kong courts have misapplied the 
Leung Kwok Hung’s rationality requirement formulation to textually 
absolute BORO rights.  Furthermore, this comment argues that courts should 
                                           
18 See generally BORO, supra note 6.  Article 8 guarantees the right of liberty of movement, Article 
16 guarantees the right of freedom of opinion and expression, Article 17 guarantees the right of freedom of 
peaceful assembly, and Article 18 guarantees freedom of association.   
19 BORO, supra note 6, art. 8.  There are variations of this language in the five articles.  See infra 
Part II.B. for a complete description.  
20 See infra Part III.  
21 See Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 184.  In addition to the rationality requirement, any 
restriction on a BORO right must also be 1) prescribed by law and 2) the means employed to restrict the 
fundamental right must be no more than is necessary to achieve that legitimate aim (“proportionality 
requirement”).  Id. at 179, 184. 
22 BORO, supra note 6, art. 17 (emphasis added). 
23 Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 184. 
24 See infra Part III. 
25 See infra Part III.B. 
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imply the requirement into the BORO to correct this misapplication.  Part II 
reviews Hong Kong’s legal system, the legal sources of fundamental rights, 
and the difference between textually absolute and textually qualified BORO 
rights.  Part III discusses Leung Kwok Hung and highlights how Hong Kong 
courts have misapplied its formulation of the rationality requirement.  Part 
IV analyzes two possible approaches for correcting this misapplication by 
authorizing the rationality requirement without reliance on the word 
“necessary” in BORO text: 1) rooting the requirement in Article 39 of the 
Basic Law or 2) implying the requirement into the BORO.  Additionally, 
Part IV argues that courts should adopt the latter approach because it bears 
little risk of being overturned.  
II. BACKGROUND 
Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region (“SAR”)26 of the 
People’s Republic of China (“PRC”).  The PRC exercises sovereignty over 
the region but leaves Hong Kong to exercise a high degree of autonomy, 
including management of its legal system.27  After transfer to the PRC in 
1997, Hong Kong retained the common law legal system left by its previous 
sovereign, the United Kingdom.28  In this system, many fundamental rights 
are derived out of the constitutionally significant BORO, which enacts the 
ICCPR.29  The BORO provides two types of rights:  1) textually qualified 
rights that contain language indicating when the right can be restricted and 
2) textually absolute rights that do not indicate when the right can be 
restricted.30   
This part of the comment provides an overview of the structure of 
fundamental rights in Hong Kong’s legal system.  First, Section A describes 
Hong Kong’s transfer in sovereignty and current legal system.  Section B 
describes how fundamental rights are derived out of BORO, highlighting the 
difference between textually absolute and textually qualified BORO rights.     
                                           
26  See XIAN FA, art. 31 (1982) (P.R.C.); see also BASIC LAW, supra note 12, arts. 2, 4. 
27  Judith R. Krebs, Comment, One Country, Three Systems? Judicial Review in Macau After Ng 
King Ling, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 111 (2000); see Basic Law, supra note 12, arts. 4, 8; see infra Part 
II.A.  
28  See infra Part II.A.  
29  See infra Part II.B.   
30  See infra Part II.B.  




A. Hong Kong’s Common Law Legal System Was Established by the 
United Kingdom and Has Survived After the Region’s Transfer to the 
PRC 
Prior to the establishment of the PRC’s sovereignty in 1997, Hong 
Kong was a British colony.31  During this time, the United Kingdom 
established a common law legal system with a complex hierarchy of courts 
and tribunals.32  The Privy Council in London held jurisdiction as the final 
court of appeal for the colony.33  The courts applied British law to all people 
living in the colony, adapting it to local conditions.34  Importantly, the legal 
system in Hong Kong acquired the British common law principles of 
equality of all parties before the law,35 judicial review over executive and 
legislative acts,36 the “rule of law,”37 and an independent judiciary.38 
In 1984, the PRC and Britain signed the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration of 1984, creating the mechanism for future transfer of 
sovereignty between the two States and defining the relationship Hong Kong 
would enjoy under Chinese sovereignty.39  Subsequently, a committee 
appointed by the PRC’s legislative body, the National People’s Congress,40 
drafted the Basic Law, codifying the relationship between Hong Kong and 
the PRC after transfer.41  In 1997, the United Kingdom formally transferred 
sovereignty and physical possession of the region to the PRC, and Hong 
Kong became a SAR under Article 31 of the PRC’s Constitution.42  Pursuant 
to Article 11 of the Basic Law, the Basic Law itself became Hong Kong’s 
constitutional authority because “[n]o law of the legislature . . . may 
contravene this law.”43  The Basic Law continues to govern the relationship 
between the PRC and Hong Kong.44   
                                           
31 YASH GHAI, supra note 16, at 1. 
32 Id. at 24.  
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 23.  
35 Id. at 266-68; BASIC LAW, supra note 12, art. 25; BORO, supra note 6, art. 22.  
36 YASH GHAI, supra note 16, at 266-68. 
37 Steve Tsang, Commitment of the Rule of Law and Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN HONG KONG 1 (Steve Tsang ed., 2001). 
38 Id.; see, e.g, BASIC LAW, supra note 12, arts. 2, 19.  
39 Albert H.Y. Chen, Constitutional Adjudication in Post-1997 Hong Kong, 15 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y 
J. 627, 628 (2006). 
40 See YASH GHAI, supra note 16, at 101-02. 
41 Id. at 35; Byron S.J. Weng, Judicial Independence Under the Basic Law, in JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN HONG KONG 48 (Steve Tsang ed., 2001). 
42 See XIAN FA, art. 31 (1982) (P.R.C.).  
43 BASIC LAW, supra note 12, art. 11.  There is considerable controversy on whether the Basic Law is 
truly a constitution, a “mini-constitution,” or an ordinary statute. See YASH GHAI, supra note 16, at 137; 
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Through the Basic Law, the National People’s Congress authorizes 
Hong Kong to exercise a “high degree of autonomy.”45  For example, the 
region is authorized to use its own regional flag;46  use a capitalist economic 
system for 50 years after transfer;47 and use English as an official language.48  
Chapter IV, Section 4 of the Basic Law specifically authorizes Hong Kong to 
operate its own legal system,49 and Article 80 authorizes Hong Kong to 
establish courts.50  Article 81 lays out the basic structure of Hong Kong’s 
judiciary.  The Court of Final Appeal is the highest appellate court, and the 
Court of Appeal is the intermediate appellate court.51  At the trial level are 
the Court of First Instance, district courts, magistrates’ courts, and 
administrative courts.52 
The Basic Law limits the courts’ power of interpretation of the Basic 
Law.53  Article 158 vests all interpretation of the Basic Law in the PRC’s 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (“NPCSC”), a 
permanent body of the PRC’s primary legislature.54  Under this Article, the 
NPCSC can issue an interpretation of the Basic Law at any time, whether 
during adjudication or not.55  Hong Kong courts are authorized with limited 
ability to interpret the Basic Law.56  Pursuant to Article 158(2), courts can 
interpret the Basic Law only during adjudication that involves subject matter 
relating to regional autonomy.57  If the subject matter, however, concerns the 
                                                                                                                              
Weng, supra note 41, at 70 n.2.  For purposes of this comment, the Basic Law will be considered Hong 
Kong’s constitution. 
44 See BASIC LAW, supra note 12, ch. II.  
45 Id. art. 2. 
46 Id. art. 10. 
47 Id. art. 5. 
48 Id. art. 9. 
49 See id. ch. IV, § 4.  
50 See BASIC LAW, supra note 12, art. 80. 
51 See id. art. 81. 
52 See id.  
53 See id. art. 158; Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, [1999] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 577 (C.F.A.); 
INTERPRETATION BY THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS OF ARTICLES 22(4) 
AND 24(2)(3) OF THE BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION (adopted by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.), June 26, 1999, http://www.hklii.org/hk/legis/en/ord/2106/ 
longtitle.html (last visited May 22, 2010) [hereinafter NPCSC Interpretation]. 
54 XIAN FA, art. 57 (1982) (P.R.C.). 
55 Director of Immigration v. Chong Fung Yuen, [2001] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 533, 545 (C.F.A.); see Ling 
Bing, Subject Matter Limitation on the NPCSC's Power to Interpret the Basic Law, 37 HONG KONG L. J. 
619, 623 (2007).  
56 See BASIC LAW, supra note 12, art. 158(2).  
57 Id.  By way of this authorization, Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal has ultimate power to 
review matters falling in the autonomy of the region, including the constitutionality of domestic laws that 
infringe on fundamental BORO rights.  See id. art. 82 (vesting final adjudication in the Court of Final 
Appeal).  Article 158(2) in conjunction with Articles 11, 81, 158(3) of the Basic Law give Hong Kong 
courts limited powers of constitutional review over domestic matters.  Richard Gordon, The Rise and Risks 




“affairs which are the responsibility of the Central People’s Government, or 
[concerns] the relationship between the Central Authorities and the Region,” 
courts must seek a final interpretation from the NPCSC.58   
As sources of law, Hong Kong courts utilize the Basic Law, common 
law, and regional ordinances enacted by the Legislative Council.59  Also, per 
Annex III of the Basic Law, a number of national laws enacted by the PRC 
apply in Hong Kong.60  However, national laws do not apply directly—
Article 18 requires the Legislative Council to enact them as regional 
ordinances.61  In Hong Kong’s complex legal system, fundamental rights are 
derived out of a number of legal sources.  The next section highlights how 
many of these rights are derived out of the BORO.62 
B. The BORO Provides ICCPR Rights to Hong Kong Residents, Stating 
Those Rights in Textually Absolute or Textually Qualified Form 
Fundamental rights are derived from the ICCPR as applied to Hong 
Kong by the BORO.63  Article 39 of the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s 
constitutional authority, mandates that the ICCPR be enacted into Hong 
Kong law.64  The ICCPR is a multilateral treaty that requires party States65 to 
provide for a range of substantive civil and political rights.66  The ICCPR 
does not, however, provide enforceable legal rights among its parties.67  
Rather, party states must implement the treaty into their domestic laws.68  In 
1991, the United Kingdom enacted the BORO in Hong Kong, giving legal 
                                                                                                                              
of Constitutional Judicial Review in Hong Kong, HONG KONG LAWYER, Dec. 2009, http://www.hk-
lawyer.com/InnerPages_features/0/1512/2009/12 (last visited Apr. 22, 2010); Weng, supra note 41, at 60.  
58 YASH GHAI, supra note 16, at 103-05.  The existence and utilization of Article 158 raises the 
question of whether the Hong Kong judiciary is truly independent.  
59 Id. at 279, 361-00.  Also, some British legislation and common law survived transfer and is still 
applied by Hong Kong courts.  
60 See BASIC LAW, supra note 12, Annex III.   
61 There are two exceptions to this rule.  Article 14 and 18 of the Basic Law allow national laws 
relating to the national military station in Hong Kong or laws of war and emergency to apply directly.  
They do not require enactment by the Legislative Council to take force in the region.  See BASIC LAW, 
supra note 12, arts. 14, 18.  
62 See infra Part II.B. 
63 Chapter III of the Basic Law provides for a number of express fundamental rights that are not 
dependent on the BORO for implementation in the region.  Additionally, many fundamental rights are 
expressly provided for in both the Basic Law and BORO.  This comment limits its focus to restrictions on 
rights derived out of the BORO and not the Basic Law.   
64 See BASIC LAW, supra note 12, art. 39.  
65 There are currently 165 parties to the ICCPR.  See ICCPR, supra note 11, ch. IV, § 4  
66 SCOTT N. CARLSON & GREGORY GRISVOLD, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 1-2 (2003). 
67 Young, supra note 13, at 115. 
68 Id.  
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effect to ICCPR rights in the region.69  The BORO survived the transfer of 
sovereignty when the Basic Law came into force and mandated that the 
ICCPR continue to be applied in Hong Kong.70  Part II of the BORO 
contains the ICCPR rights applied to Hong Kong.71  
The BORO contains rights stated in either absolute terms or qualified 
terms.  In total, the BORO contains twenty-three Articles protecting 
fundamental rights.72  Nineteen of these rights are stated in absolute terms, 
with no language stating when and how the right can be restricted.73  This 
comment refers to these rights as “textually absolute rights” for ease of 
reference.74  In contrast, the remaining five articles are stated in qualified 
terms, containing language that states when and for what purposes the right 
may be restricted.75  For example, four76 of these articles use the language 
that restrictions are only permissible when “necessary to protect national 
security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals” or the “rights 
and freedoms of others . . . .”77  The remaining article, Article 21, providing 
the right to participate in public life, permits restrictions that are not 
“unreasonable.”78  This comment refers to rights containing qualifying 
language as “textually qualified rights” because they provide for permissible 
qualifications on rights in their text.79  Confusingly, there is no general 
scheme for limitations on rights provided in the BORO.80  It is unclear why 
the drafters of both documents chose certain rights to have language 
providing for limitations but did not for others.81  The next section describes 
                                           
69 Johannes Chan & Yash Ghai, A Comparative Perspective on the Bill of Rights, in THE HONG 
KONG BILL OF RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 1 (Yohannes Chan & Yash Ghai eds., 1993) 
70 See Young, supra note 13, at 110; Chan & Ghai, supra note 69, at 1. 
71 See BORO, supra note 6, Part II. 
72 See id. 
73 This comment refers to these rights as “textually absolute” rights. 
74 See supra text accompanying note 16. 
75 These articles are: Article 8 guaranteeing the right of liberty of movement, Article 16 guaranteeing 
the right of freedom of opinion and expression, Article 17 guaranteeing the right of freedom of peaceful 
assembly, and Article 18 guaranteeing freedom of association.  The language in these articles matches the 
ICCPR verbatim.  
76 Article 5 provides the fifth right, liberty and security of persons, that contains limiting language.  
This article states that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived 
of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.” 
77 Article 16(3)(a) has a slight variation on this language: “for respect of the rights or reputations of 
others.”  Many of the rights also require that the restriction be provided by law.  Because Article 39 of the 
Basic Law already requires restrictions to be prescribed by law, this language does not need to be examined 
here.  
78 This language was interpreted by the Court of First Instance in Chan Kin Sum v. Secretary for 
Justice, [2009] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 166, 192-195 (C.F.I.).  This language has not been examined by Hong Kong’s 
appellate courts to date.  Thus, this comment will not focus on this BORO right.  
79 See supra text accompanying n.16. 
80 YASH GHAI, supra note 16, at 424. 
81 Id. (“it is hard to understand why [these rights] have been so singled out”).   




how courts have utilized a rationality requirement when considering the 
validity of restrictions on both textually absolute and textually qualified 
BORO rights. 
III. LEUNG KWOK HUNG FORMULATED THE RATIONALITY REQUIREMENT, 
WHICH SUBSEQUENT COURTS HAVE MISAPPLIED 
For restrictions on BORO rights to be constitutional, they must meet 
the rationality requirement, mandating that restrictions be rationally 
connected with the pursuit of one or more legitimate societal aims.82  In 
2005, the Court of Final Appeal formulated the standard for the rationality 
requirement in Leung Kwok Hung & Others v. HKSAR.83  In its decision, the 
Court asserted that the rationality requirement is authorized by the word 
“necessary” in the constitutional text of the textually qualified article before 
the Court.84  Since then, all levels of courts have consistently applied the 
Leung Kwok Hung formulation.85  Rather than limit Leung Kwok Hung to 
textually qualified BORO rights, however, later courts have misapplied the 
rationality requirement.86  These courts have cited Leung Kwok Hung when 
applying the rationality requirement to restrictions on textually absolute 
BORO rights where there is no language from which to derive the rationality 
requirement.87 
This part of the comment provides an overview of the Leung Kwok 
Hung decision and its later application arguing that courts have misapplied 
                                           
82 Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 184. 
83 Id.  The rationality requirement was first articulated by the Court of Appeal in R v. Sing Yau 
Ming, [1991] H.K.L.Y. 134 (C.A.).  With later cases, the Court of Appeal has implicitly rejected Sing Yau 
Ming’s approach.  See Hung Chan Wa & Another v. HKSAR, [2005] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 291, [81] (C.A.).  
Furthermore, the relationship of the BORO with the Letters Patent, Hong Kong’s pre-1997 constitutionality 
authority, is different than the relationship with the Basic Law.  For these reasons, this comment focuses on 
jurisprudence post-1997 Hong Kong.  For an account of the requirements in pre-1997 Hong Kong, see 
Yash Ghai, Sentinels of Liberty or Sheep in Woolf's Clothing? Judicial Politics and the Hong Kong Bill of 
Rights, 60 MODERN L. REV. 459, 467-71 (1997), http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1097209.pdf (last 
visited May 22, 2010). 
84 Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 184.  
85 To the author’s knowledge, courts have cited Leung Kwok Hung as precedent for the rationality 
requirement in 10 cases.  These include:  HKSAR v. Ng Po On, [2008] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 176, 191-92 (C.F.A.),  
Mo Yuk Ping v. HKSAR, [2007] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 750, 78 (C.F.A.); HKSAR v. Lam Kwong Wai, [2006] 3 
H.K.L.R.D. 808, 825 (C.F.A.); Official Receiver & Trustee in Bankruptcy of Chan Wing Hing & Another 
v. Chan Wing Hing & Another & Secretary for Justice (Intervener), [2006] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 687, 699 
(C.F.A.); Chan Hei Ling Helen v. Medical Council of Hong Kong, [2009] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 174, 51 (C.A.); 
Kwok Hay Kwong v. Medical Council of Hong Kong, [2008] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 524, 536 (C.A.); Chan Hau 
Man Christina v. Commissioner of Police, [2009] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 797, 811 (C.F.I.); Wong Tze Yam v. 
Commissioner of Police, [2009] 5 H.K.L.R.D. 836, 846-47 (C.F.I.); Chan Kin Sum, 2 H.K.L.R.D. at 194; 
Democratic Party v. Secretary for Justice, [2007] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 804, 818-19 (C.F.I.). 
86 See infra Part III.B.  
87 See id.  
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the rationality requirement to textually absolute rights.  Section A discusses 
the Court of Final Appeal’s decision in Leung Kwok Hung.  Section B 
highlights how courts have misapplied Leung Kwok Hung’s rationality 
requirement formulation to textually absolute rights.   
A. In Leung Kwok Hung, the Court of Final Appeal Formulated the 
Rationality Requirement, Deriving It from the Word Necessary in 
BORO Text 
In Leung Kwok Hung & Others v. HKSAR,88 the Court of Final 
Appeal formulated the rationality requirement.  In this case, assembly 
leaders led a procession involving between forty and ninety-six people 
without giving mandatory notice to the police pursuant to Section 13A of the 
Public Order Ordinance.89  Section 13A requires that all assembly organizers 
give written notice to the police of all processions involving more than thirty 
people, with descriptions of the purpose, time, route, and estimated number 
of people.90  Section 14(1) of the same ordinance gives the Commissioner of 
Police discretion to object to the procession if the Commissioner reasonably 
considers objection “necessary in the interests of national security or public 
safety, or public order (ordre public) or the protection of the rights and 
freedom of others.”91  A magistrate convicted the assembly leaders, and the 
Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction.  The assembly leaders appealed to 
the Court of Final Appeal.92   
At issue before the Court was whether Section 14(1) of the ordinance 
violated the assembly leaders’ right to peaceful assembly under Article 17 of 
the BORO, a textually qualified right.  Article 17 states: 
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized.  No 
restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other 
than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the 
                                           
88 Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 164. 
89 Public Order Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 245, § 13A. (H.K.); Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 
176.  The Public Order Ordinance is “concerned with regulation of public assemblies.” HONG KONG 
POLICE, GUIDELINES ON THE APPROACH TO THE PUBLIC ORDER ORDINANCE IN RELATION TO PUBLIC 
MEETINGS AND PUBLIC PROCESSIONS 1 (2008), http://www.police.gov.hk/ppp_en/08_forms/doc/poop08.pdf 
(last visited May 10, 2010). 
90 Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 164.  
91 Public Order Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 245, § 14(1). (H.K.) 
92 Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 177. 




protection of public health or morals or the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. 
From its text, Article 17 provides both the right to peacefully assemble as 
well as permissible grounds in which to restrict the right.   
Turning to the question of the constitutionality of the restriction, the 
Court stated that “the restriction must be necessary in a democratic society93 
in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre 
public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.”94  In this way, the Court asserted that the 
rationality requirement was necessary for a restriction to be to be 
constitutional.  
From there, the Court formulated the rationality requirement from the 
word “necessary.”  First, the Court inferred a “proportionality test” from the 
word “necessary” in the Article 17 text by asserting that “the constitutional 
requirement of necessity involves the application of a proportionality test.”95  
Second, the Court defined the proportionality test to include the rationality 
requirement.  Specifically, the Court asserted “the proportionality test should 
be formulated in these terms . . . the restriction must be rationally connected 
with one or more of the legitimate purposes . . . .”96  This statement 
establishes the rationality requirement by requiring a rational connection 
between a restriction on a BORO right and a legitimate state aim.97  
Attempting to support its adoption of the rationality requirement, the 
Court cited two cases.98  Unfortunately, the Court’s opinion did not explain 
how these cases actually supported the adoption of the rationality 
requirement.99  Furthermore, the opinion did not explain how these cases 
                                           
93 Id. at 183.  Although Hong Kong is not a democracy, the Court interpreted this text as following 
the Siracusa Principles on the Limitations and Derogation Provisions in the ICCPR, where a group of 
experts state that a society which recognizes the human rights set forth in the United Nationals Charter and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may be viewed as meeting the definition of a democratic 
society.  The Court also noted that this interpretation is consistent with that of the European Court of 
Human Rights.  
94 Id.  
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 184 (emphasis added).  The Court also defined the proportionality test as including a 
“proportionality requirement,” requiring that “the means used to impair the right of peacefully assembly 
must be no more than is necessary to accomplish the legitimate purpose in question.” 
97 Id.  
98 See Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 183 (citing HKSAR v. Ng Kung Siu & Another, [1999] 3 
H.K.L.R.D. 907 (C.F.A.)) (holding that the aims of a flag desecration law were within permissible 
restrictions provided by the BORO text); Ming Pao Newspapers Ltd. & Others v. A-G of Hong Kong, 
[1996] 2 H.K.L.R. 239, 248 (P.C.) (appeal taken from H.K.) (pre-transfer Privy Council case citing British 
precedent as authorizing the rationality requirement)).   
99 See Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 183 
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supported the formulation that the requirement is derived out of the word 
“necessary.”100   
Turning to the application of the newly established rationality 
requirement formulation, the Court held that the Commissioner’s discretion 
to restrict the assembly leaders’ right to peaceful assembly, authorized by 
the ordinance in question, was within public order.101  In making this 
holding, the Court reasoned that the restriction on peaceful assembly 
satisfied the rationality requirement: “The discretion is of assistance in 
enabling Government to fulfill its positive duty.  It is a limited discretion, 
constrained by the proportionality test.” 102   
Overall, the Leung Kwok Hung Court formulated a basis for the 
rationality requirement for textually qualified rights, such as the right of 
peaceful assembly at issue before the Court.  It held that the word 
“necessary” in the BORO text involved the application of a proportionality 
test, which includes the rationality requirement.  The Court, however, did 
not state or indicate whether this holding should extend to textually absolute 
rights.  Leung Kwok Hung is now the primary case authorizing the 
rationality requirement for textually qualified rights—courts have cited 
Leung Kwok Hung in all but one case considering textually qualified 
rights.103 
B. Courts Have Misapplied the Leung Kwok Hung Formulation when 
Considering Restrictions on Textually Absolute Rights 
Several cases have cited Leung Kwok Hung as authority for the 
rationality requirement when considering the constitutionality of restrictions 
on the textually absolute BORO rights of the right to equality before the 
law104 and the right to be presumed innocent.105  These rights do not contain 
the word “necessary” or any other words in which to derive the rationality 
requirement, as was formulated by Leung Kwok Hung.106  Thus, this 
                                           
100 See id.  
101 Id. at 197. 
102 Again, this use of the term “proportionality test” includes the rationality requirement.  
103 See, e.g., Chan Hei Ling Helen v. Medical Council of Hong Kong, 4 H.K.L.R.D. at 51; Chan Kin 
Sum, 2 H.K.L.R.D. at 194; Chan Hau Man Christina, 4 H.K.L.R.D. at 811.  The one case that did not cite 
Leung Kwok Hung is Kong Yun Kim v. Director of Welfare, [2009] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 382 (C.F.I.).  In this 
case, the Court of First Instance merely applied the rationality requirement but did not cite any authority for 
its use or explain how it was derived.  See Kong Yun Kim, 4 H.K.L.R.D. at 415-17.  
104 See Leung v. Secretary for Justice, [2006] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 211 (C.F.A). 
105 See Lam Kwong Wai, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 825; Ng Po On, 4 H.K.L.R.D. at 191-92. 
106 BORO rights provide for rights in the ICCPR, and ICCPR rights reflect the scheme of providing 
textually absolute and textually qualified rights.  YASH GHAI, supra note 16, at 424.  Interestingly, Dr. 
Nihal Jayawickrama has suggested that textually absolute rights in the ICCPR “may not be restricted on 




comment argues that these cases have misapplied Leung Kwok Hung’s 
rationality requirement formulation.  
One court has misapplied the Leung Kwok Hung formulation when 
considering the textually absolute right of equality before the law.  In Leung 
v. Secretary for Justice,107 the Court of Final Appeal considered a restriction 
on Article 22 of the BORO.108  This textually absolute Article provides that 
“[a]ll people are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law . . . .”109  There is no further 
language expressly stating for what legitimate purposes a restriction is 
authorized.110  Before the Court, a 20-year-old homosexual petitioner argued 
that Section 118C of the Crimes Ordinance111 was contrary to his right to 
equality before the law guaranteed by Article 22 of the BORO.112  Section 
118c makes “homosexual buggery113 with or by [a] man under 21” an 
offense.114  Specifically, the plaintiff argued that the law resulted in unequal 
treatment because a 16-year-old heterosexual person could legally engage in 
sexual intercourse, but a 16-year-old homosexual person could not engage in 
buggery.115  In considering the constitutionality of Section 118C, the Court 
cited Leung Kwok Hung as authorizing the rationality requirement.116  The 
Court, however, did not discuss how the rationality requirement was derived 
out of the textually absolute right BORO right.117  Applying the rationality 
requirement, the Court held that the restriction was unconstitutional because 
there was no rational justification for the restriction.118  Thus, overall, the 
Court misapplied the Leung Kwok Hung formulation in this case because the 
BORO article before the Court did not contain the word “necessary” in 
which to derive the requirement.  
Several courts have misapplied Leung Kwok Hung’s rationality 
requirement formulation to the textually absolute right to be presumed 
                                                                                                                              
any grounds whatsoever.”  See NIHAL JAYAWICKRAMA, THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 182-83 (2002).  This raises the question 
of whether Hong Kong courts should allow any restrictions on textually absolute BORO rights. This 
question is beyond the scope of this comment.  
107 Leung v. Secretary for Justice, [2006] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 211 (C.F.A). 
108 See id. at 234-41. 
109 BORO, supra note 6, art. 22.   
110 See id.  
111 Crimes Ordinance, (1991) Cap. 200, § 118C (H.K.). 
112 See BORO, supra note 6, art. 22.  
113 Buggery is defined as sodomy.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 207 (8th ed. 2004).  
114 Crimes Ordinance, (1991) Cap. 200, § 118C (H.K.). 
115 See Leung v. Secretary for Justice, 4 H.K.L.R.D. at 235. 
116 Id. 
117 See id. 
118 See Leung v. Secretary for Justice, 4 H.K.L.R.D. at 239-40. 
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innocent contained in Article 11(1) of the BORO.119  This Article provides 
that “[e]veryone charged with a criminal offense shall have the right to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”120  There is no 
language stating for what legitimate purposes a restriction is authorized.121  
Because this article does not contain the word “necessary,” these courts have 
misapplied the Leung Kwok Hung formulation.  Two cases are illustrative. 
The first case is HKSAR v. Lam Kwong Wai.122  The government, 
respondents, charged petitioners with possessing imitation firearms, which 
was prohibited by Section 20(3) of the Firearms and Ammunition 
Ordinance.123  This statute provides that a person who is in possession of an 
imitation firearm is presumed to have committed an offense, unless he or she 
proves to the magistrate that he or she was not in possession of the imitation 
firearm for a purpose dangerous to the public peace or of committing an 
offense.124  Petitioners argued to the Court of Final Appeal that the 
persuasive onus imposed by the Ordinance was contrary to their right to be 
presumed innocent, which is guaranteed by Article 11(1) of the BORO.125  
The Court cited Leung Kwok Hung as authority for applying the rationality 
requirement for the textually absolute Article 22.126  The Court, however, did 
not discuss how the rationality requirement was derived out of a BORO 
article that did not contain the word “necessary.”127  Applying the rationality 
requirement, the Court reasoned that Section 20(3) fulfilled the rationality 
requirement because its legislative purpose was the “prevention, suppression 
and punishment of serious crime,” especially since imitation firearms were 
hard to distinguish from real firearms.128  Because Article 11(1) does not 
contain the word “necessary” in which to derive the rationality requirement, 
this Court misapplied the Leung Kwok Hung formulation.  
The second illustrative case is HKSAR v. Hung Chan Wa & 
Another.129  Before the Court of Final Appeal, respondents argued that 
Section 47 of the Dangerous Drug Ordinance, under which they were 
                                           
119 See Lam Kwong Wai, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 825; HKSAR v. Hung Chan Wa & Another, [2006] 3 
H.K.L.R.D. at [75]; Ng Po On, 4 H.K.L.R.D. at 191-92. 
120 BORO, supra note 6, art. 11(1).  
121 See id.  
122 Lam Kwong Wai, 3 H.K.L.R.D. 808 
123 Id. at 817; Firearms and Ammunition Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 238, § 20(3). (H.K.). 
124 See Firearms and Ammunition Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 238, § 20(3). (H.K.). 
125 Lam Kwong Wai, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 815. 
126 See id. at 825. 
127 See id.  
128 Id. at 826.  
129 HKSAR v. Hung Chan Wa & Another, [2006] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 841 (C.F.A.). 




originally convicted,130 encroached on their right to be presumed innocent 
pursuant to Article 11(1) of the BORO.131  Specifically, Section 47 provides 
that “any person who is proved or presumed to have had a dangerous drug in 
his possession shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to have 
known the nature of such drug.”132  The Court did not expressly cite Leung 
Kwok Hung as authority for the rationality requirement.133  Rather, the Court 
implicitly cited Leung Kwok Hung by citing Lam Kwong Wai, a case that 
directly cited Leung Kwok Hung.134  To emphasize its implicit adoption of 
Leung Kwok Hung, the Court in Hung Chan Wa stated “[a]s this Court 
discusses the relevant principles governing these matters in . . . Lam Kwong 
Wai . . . there is no occasion to repeat what is said there.”135  Applying the 
rationality requirement, the Court reasoned that the presumptions were 
rationally connected with the legitimate objectives of preventing trade and 
use of dangerous drugs, especially as prosecutors often had difficulty 
proving possession.136  Again, because Article 11(1) does not contain the 
word “necessary” in which to derive the rationality requirement, the Court 
misapplied the Leung Kwok Hung formulation. 
Overall, courts have applied Leung Kwok Hung’s formulation of the 
rationality requirement to the textually absolute right to be equal before the 
law and the right to be presumed innocent.  Because Leung Kwok Hung 
asserted that the rationality requirement is rooted in qualifying language in 
the BORO text, these courts have misapplied the formulation, as textually 
absolute rights do not contain any qualifying language.  
IV. COURTS SHOULD CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR 
AUTHORIZING THE RATIONALITY REQUIREMENT 
Hong Kong courts’ extensive citation of Leung Kwok Hung suggests 
that the case’s rationality requirement formulation is now entrenched as 
authority for courts considering the constitutionality of restrictions on 
BORO rights.137  As discussed infra, courts have misapplied the formulation 
                                           
130 Respondents were originally convicted by a magistrate of possessing a container containing a 
dangerous drug, but the Court of Appeal reversed.  Hung Chan Wa, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at [37].  The 
government, as petitioners, appealed to the Court of Final Appeal.  Id. 
131 Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, (1992) Cap. 134, § 47. (H.K.); see Hung Chan Wa, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 
[38]. 
132 Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, (1992) Cap. 134, § 47. 
133 See Hung Chan Wa, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at [75]. 
134 Id. (citing Lam Kwong Wai, 3 H.K.L.R.D. 808). 
135 Id. (citing Lam Kwong Wai, 3 H.K.L.R.D. 808).  Lam Kwong Wai is discussed in Part III.B. 
136 Id. at [76].  
137 See supra text accompanying note 85.  
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to textually absolute rights that do not contain qualifying language in which 
to derive the rationality requirement according to Leung Kwok Hung’s 
formulation.138  This part of the comment examines two possible approaches 
for correcting courts’ misapplication of Leung Kwok Hung.  Both approaches 
would allow courts to authorize the rationality requirement for both textually 
absolute and textually qualified BORO rights without reliance on the word 
“necessary.”  Section A examines the possible approach of rooting the 
rationality requirement in Article 39 of the Basic Law.  Section B examines 
the possible approach of implying the rationality requirement into the 
BORO.  Furthermore, Section B argues that courts should follow the latter 
approach of implying the rationality requirement into the BORO. 
A. Courts Could Interpret the Words “Prescribed by Law” of Article 39 
of the Basic Law as Authorizing the Rationality Requirement 
The first possible approach is for Hong Kong courts to interpret 
Article 39 of the Basic Law as authorizing the rationality requirement.  
Deriving the rationality requirement from the Basic Law would serve to 
make the requirement applicable to all rights enjoyed by Hong Kong 
residents.139  However, courts may be reluctant to interpret the Basic Law 
beyond its text.  Courts may also be reluctant to develop an interpretation 
that could be overturned by the NPCSC.  
Article 39 of the Basic Law mandates that the ICCPR be applied to 
Hong Kong, providing the constitutional basis for the entire BORO.140  
Accordingly, deriving the rationality requirement from language in Article 
39 would serve to authorize the requirement for the entire BORO, including 
both textually absolute and textually qualified BORO rights.  In Ng Ka Ling 
& Others v. Director of Immigration, the Court of Final Appeal set out the 
basic approach to interpreting the Basic Law.141  The Court asserted that a 
“purposive approach” is to be used when interpreting the Basic Law: 
The adoption of a purposive approach is necessary because a 
constitution states general principles and expresses purposes 
without condescending to particularity and definition of terms.  
Gaps and ambiguities are bound to arise, and in resolving them, 
the courts are bound to give effect to the principles and 
                                           
138 See supra Part III.B.  
139 See BASIC LAW, supra note 12, art. 39. 
140 Id. 
141 Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, [1999] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 577 (C.F.A.); Yash Ghai, The 
Intersection of Chinese Law and the Common Law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: 
Question of Technique or Politics? 37 HONG KONG L. J. 363, 385 (2007). 




purposes declared in, and to be ascertained from the 
constitutional and relevant extrinsic materials.  So, in 
ascertaining the true meaning of the instrument, the court must 
consider the purpose of the instrument and its relevant 
provisions as well as the language of the text in the light of the 
context, context being of particular importance in the 
interpretation of a constitutional instrument.142 
In this way, the Court of Final Appeal stated that courts should interpret the 
Basic Law according to its legislative purpose.  When doing so, Hong Kong 
courts primarily look to text when determining legislative intent.143   
Following these principles of statutory interpretation, courts could 
interpret language in Article 39 of the Basic Law to derive the rationality 
requirement.144  Article 39 specifically states: 
The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights . . . as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in 
force and shall be implemented through the laws of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region. 
The rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents shall 
not be restricted unless as prescribed by law.  Such restrictions 
shall not contravene the provisions of the preceding paragraph 
of this Article.145 
In its text, Article 39 mandates that the ICCPR is to be applied to Hong 
Kong, which is achieved by the BORO.  The Article also states that rights 
can only be restricted by law.  
The words “prescribed by law” in Article 39 are a potential source for 
interpretation because they already note a basis for restriction of rights—that 
they be imposed through law.  A court could interpret these words as 
requiring that restrictions imposed by the Legislative Council also meet the 
rationality requirement.  In a sense, this interpretation would serve as a 
limitation on the extent that the Legislative Council could restrict a BORO 
right by law. 
                                           
142 Ng Ka Ling, 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 339-40. 
143 Chong Fung Yuen, 2 H.K.L.R.D. at 546 (“The courts' role under the common law in interpreting 
the Basic Law is to construe the language used in the text of the instrument in order to ascertain the 
legislative intent as expressed in the language.  Their task is not to ascertain the intent of the lawmaker on 
its own.  Their duty is to ascertain what was meant by the language used and to give effect to the legislative 
intent as expressed in the language.  It is the text of the enactment which is the law and it is regarded as 
important both that the law should be certain and that it should be ascertainable by the citizen.”). 
144 See Ghai, supra note 141, at 386.  
145 BASIC LAW, supra note 12, art. 39. 
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Interpreting  Article 39 in this manner would have two strengths.  The 
first strength would be that the rationality requirement would not depend on 
Leung Kwok Hung’s formulation that the rationality requirement be derived 
from the word “necessary” contained in BORO rights.  Rather, the 
rationality requirement would have a constitutional basis in the Basic Law.  
The second strength would be that the rationality requirement would be 
mandated for all rights contained in Hong Kong’s legal system.  Article 39 
covers “[t]he rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents.”146  This 
language presumably covers not only textually absolute and textually 
qualified BORO rights but also all rights contained in the Basic Law, 
domestic legislation, and common law.  Thus, interpreting Article 39 as 
authorizing the rationality requirement would serve to mandate that all 
restrictions imposed by the Legislative Council be rationally connected to 
legitimate state aims.  
Despite this approach’s strengths, courts are unlikely to interpret the 
Basic Law in this manner.  Courts are resistant to adopting an interpretation 
that is weakly supported by the text.147  Illustrating this point, the Court of 
Final Appeal in Director of Immigration v. Chong Fung Yuen stated that 
“the courts must avoid a literal, technical, narrow or rigid approach [of the 
Basic Law], they cannot give the language a meaning which it cannot 
bear.”148  The plain meaning of the words “prescribed by law” may merely 
dictate that restrictions be imposed by law.149  The words may simply not 
support a broad interpretation authorizing the rationality requirement.  
Accordingly, courts may be unwilling to broadly interpret Article 39 as 
supporting the rationality requirement.150    
Courts may be unwilling to adopt a broad interpretation of Article 39 
because their interpretation could be overturned by a contrary NPCSC 
interpretation.151  Pursuant to Article 158 of the Basic Law, the NPCSC has 
power of interpretation over the Basic Law in all cases.152  Through this 
power, the NPCSC can overturn any Hong Kong courts’ interpretation of the 
Basic Law.  This threat is not merely theoretical.153  In Ng Ka Ling, the 
NPCSC rejected a Court of Final Appeal interpretation of the Basic Law by 
                                           
146 See id. 
147 See Chong Fung Yuen, 2 H.K.L.R.D. at 546. 
148 Id.  
149 See Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 181-82. 
150 See also Yang Xiaonan, Legislative Interpretations by the Standing Committee of the National 
People's Congress in China, 38 HONG KONG L. J. 255, 268 (2008). 
151 See Chen, supra note 39, at 662; Po Jen Yap, Constitutional Review under the Basic Law: The 
Rise, Retreat and Resurgence of Judicial Power in Hong Kong, 37 HONG KONG L. J. 449, 473 (2007). 
152 See Basic Law, supra note 12, art. 158.  
153 See Ng Ka Ling, 1 H.K.L.R.D. 577; NPCSC Interpretation, supra note 53. 




issuing a contrary interpretation that trumped the Court’s.154  In order to 
avoid a similar situation to Ng Ka Ling, courts may interpret the Basic Law 
in a politically sensitive matter that does not provoke a response from the 
NPCSC.155  Thus, courts may be reluctant to interpret Article 39 as 
authorizing the rationality requirement.   
Overall, courts could broadly interpret Article 39 of the BORO as 
authorizing the rationality requirement.  However, courts may be unwilling 
to interpret the Basic Law beyond its text.  Furthermore, courts may be 
unwilling to risk a contrary NPCSC interpretation.    
B. Courts Should Imply the Rationality Requirement into the BORO 
Rather than root the rationality requirement in the Basic Law, Hong 
Kong courts should follow a second possible approach:  Implying the 
rationality requirement into the BORO.  Doing so would authorize the 
rationality requirement for both textually absolute and textually qualified 
rights.156  Furthermore, this approach would lead to little risk of the courts’ 
interpretations being overturned by the Legislative Council or NPCSC.157  
Courts could utilize two potential methods to implying the rationality 
requirement into the BORO:  1) courts could liberally construe BORO 
articles or 2) courts could interpret Article 2(4) of the BORO as 
incorporating the rationality requirement.  
1. Courts Could Liberally Construe BORO Articles 
The first method courts could use to imply the rationality 
requirement158 is to liberally construe BORO articles.  “A statute is liberally 
construed when its letter is extended to include matters within the spirit or 
purpose of the statute.”159  Following this principle, courts construe the 
BORO according to its purpose.  The stated purpose is provided in the 
preamble of the BORO: “to provide for incorporation into the law of Hong 
Kong of provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
                                           
154 See Ng Ka Ling, 1 H.K.L.R.D. 577; NPCSC Interpretation, supra note 53.  
155 See Chen, supra note 39, at 662; Yap, supra note 151, at 473. 
156 See infra Part IV.B.i. 
157 See infra Part IV.B.ii. 
158 In Lam Kwong Wai, the Court of Final Appeal stated that “[i]n Hong Kong, it has been accepted 
that a justification provision is to be implied in the BOR[O].”  3 H.K.L.R.D. at 819.  The Court used the 
justification provision as including the rationality requirement.  Unfortunately, the Court did not elucidate 
on what grounds the rationality requirement is implied in the BORO.  Furthermore, the Court’s ultimate 
decision in this case to adopt the rationality requirement was based on Leung Kwok Hung.   The basis of the 
Court’s statement is uncertain. 
159 NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 58.6 (6th ed. 2000).  
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Rights as applied to Hong Kong.”160  Furthermore, a general rule of statutory 
construction in Hong Kong is that the legislature intended the legislation to 
conform to public international law.161  Applying this rule to the preamble 
suggests that the legislature, when enacting the ordinance, intended the 
BORO to conform to foreign interpretations of the ICCPR.  Accordingly, 
courts could consider foreign jurisprudence that implies the rationality 
requirement into the ICCPR.   
For example, courts could imply the rationality requirement into 
Article 22 of the BORO by referring to Canadian jurisprudence that implies 
the requirement into the ICCPR.  Article 22 of the BORO provides the right 
to equality before the law and is verbatim of Article 26 of the ICCPR.162  
Neither the ICCPR nor the BORO articles contain qualifying language.163  
The Supreme Court of Canada has authorized the rationality requirement 
when considering restrictions on the ICCPR right to equality, “accept[ing] 
the constitutionality of legislation providing for differential treatment if 
reasonable classifications were made, rationally connected with the 
legitimate object of the statute.”164  Thus, looking to foreign jurisdictions, 
Hong Kong courts could follow Canada’s interpretation of Article 26 of the 
ICCPR and thereby imply the rationality requirement Article 22 of the 
BORO.  
2. Courts Could Imply the Rationality Requirement into Article 2(4) of 
the BORO 
The second method courts could use to imply the rationality 
requirement is to interpret Article 2(4) of the BORO as including the 
rationality requirement.  This Article provides: “Nothing in this Ordinance 
shall be interpreted as implying for the Government . . . any right to engage 
in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the 
rights and freedoms recognized in the Bill of Rights . . . .”165  In a sense, all 
restrictions on BORO rights imposed by the Legislative Council are “aimed 
at the destruction” because the restrictions prevent the full enjoyment of the 
BORO right.  Article 2(4) seems to prohibit the government from excessive 
restriction of BORO rights.  Courts could reason that the rationality 
                                           
160 BORO, supra note 6, at pmbl.  
161 Carole J. Petersen, The Right to Equality in the Public Sector: An Assessment of Post-Colonial 
Hong Kong, 32 HONG KONG L. J. 103, 125 (2002) (citing R v Sin Yau Ming, 1 H.K.P.L.R. at 105). 
162 Compare BORO, supra note 6, art. 22, with ICCPR, supra note 11, art. 26.  
163 Compare BORO, supra note 6, art. 22, with ICCPR, supra note 11, art. 26.  
164 JAYAWICKRAMA, supra note 106, at 822 (citing Mckay v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 370 (Can.)).  
165 BORO, supra note 6, art. 2(4). 




requirement is implied in Article 2(4) because it reduces the Legislative 
Council’s ability to “destroy” BORO rights.  Because this provision applies 
to all rights contained in the BORO, authorizing the rationality requirement 
in this provision would cover both textually absolute and textually qualified 
rights. 
Both of these approaches would serve to overturn Leung Kwok 
Hung’s prescription that the rationality requirement be rooted in the word 
“necessary.”  Rather, these approaches would derive the rationality 
requirement from foreign interpretations of the ICCPR or the all-rights 
encompassing Article 2(4) of the BORO.  Therefore, the rationality 
requirement would not be reliant on qualifying language in BORO text as 
prescribed by Leung Kwok Hung, but rather become a doctrine rooted in 
statutory interpretation of the BORO. 
3. Implying the Rationality Requirement into the BORO Runs Little Risk 
of Being Overturned by the Legislative Council or NPCSC 
Implying the rationality requirement into the BORO is unlikely to be 
overturned by the Legislative Council or NPCSC.  If the courts were to 
imply the rationality requirement into the BORO, the Legislative Council 
could attempt to negate the courts by amending or supplementing the BORO 
in a manner that expressly eliminates the courts’ interpretations of the 
BORO.  This situation, however, would be unlikely for three reasons.  First, 
the Council has rarely modified the BORO.166  Since 1991, only several 
small modifications have been made.167  Second, Hong Kong is heavily 
reliant on its image as an international finance center.168  The Council is 
unlikely to risk damage to this image by degrading Hong Kong’s compliance 
with international human rights standards.169  Because the BORO applies the 
ICCPR to Hong Kong, any major modification to the BORO would lead to 
international scrutiny by human rights groups and monitoring by the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee.170  Third, the Council is unlikely to risk 
provoking strong opposition and protest from Hong Kong’s politically 
motivated residents.  They are unlikely to repeat the situation in 2003, when 
“vehement protests, culminating in a half-million strong protest march, 
                                           
166 See Young, supra note 13, at 110. 
167 Id.  
168 See Sir Anthony Mason, The Place of Comparative Law in Developing the Jurisprudence on the 
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170 See CARLSON & GRISVOLD, supra note 66, at 4-13.  Amnesty International monitors human rights 
in Hong Kong.  See also Amnesty International USA, Hong Kong Human Rights. 
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586 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 19 NO. 3 
 
 
forced the government to drop the [introduction of national security 
legislation].”171  Fourth, the Council is unlikely to risk invalidation of 
modifications to the BORO.  If modifications were enacted, courts would be 
able to engage in constitutional review of the modifications, reviewing 
whether they are contrary to Article 39’s mandate of applying the ICCPR to 
Hong Kong.172   
Implying the rationality requirement into the BORO would also 
remain outside NPCSC jurisdiction.  Under Article 158 of the Basic Law, 
the NPCSC jurisdiction limited to interpretation of the Basic Law, not 
domestic legislation.  Courts’ interpretation of domestic legislation, such as 
the BORO, cannot be overturned by the NPCSC.  Accordingly, if the 
rationality requirement is rooted in BORO interpretation, the NPCSC cannot 
issue a contrary interpretation of the BORO.   
Overall, courts should imply the rationality requirement into the 
BORO because doing so would authorize the requirement for textually 
absolute and textually qualified rights.  Furthermore, there would be little 
risk of the courts’ being overturned by the Legislative Council or NPCSC. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Hong Kong Courts have misapplied Leung Kwok Hung’s formulation 
by applying the rationality requirement when considering restrictions on 
textually absolute BORO rights.  This is contrary to the Court of Final 
Appeal’s formulation set out in Leung Kwok Hung in which the rationality 
requirement is derived from the word “necessary” in qualifying language in 
the BORO article.  In order to correct this misapplication, courts should 
consider two potential approaches to authorizing the rationality requirement 
for BORO rights.  First, courts could interpret Article 39 of the Basic Law 
“purposively” and interpret words in its text to require the rationality 
requirement.  Second, courts could imply the rationality requirement into the 
BORO.  While both of these two approaches would eliminate the rationality 
requirement’s reliance on the word “necessary” in the BORO as formulated 
by Leung Kwok Hung, courts should adopt second approach because it bears 
little risk of being overturned by the Legislative Council or Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress. 
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